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I. INTRODUCTION
Under present federal regulation, a pharmaceutical company that is
attempting to gain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for
marketing a new drug is responsible for conducting the necessary drug
experimentation.' It has been forcefully argued that because the company
has a financial interest in successful test results, the present drug testing
system contains an inherent bias2 that adversely affects the accuracy and
acceptability of drug research. 3 Concern about these effects has led to
proposals that pharmaceutical research be conducted by independent parties
with no financial interest in the outcome of the research.4 To evaluate
whether such regulatory changes are necessary, this Article will examine the
relationship between the profit-oriented testing of drugs and the need for
both ethical human experimentation and accurate experimental data. Con-
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., Part 5
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 5)];
Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly
of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 7 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 7)];
Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly
of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 10 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10)];
Hearings on Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation Before the Sub-
comm. on Reorganiztion and Internat'l Organizations of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Interagency Coordination in Drug
Research and Regulation];
Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975, Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare and the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part
)];
Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1976, Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare and the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part
2)];
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEW DRUG TESTING IS NOT ADE-
QUATELY PROTECTING HUMAN TEST SUBJECTS AND THE PUBLIC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEW DRUG TESTING];
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, EXPERIMENTS AND RESEARCH WITH HUMANS: VALUES IN
CONFLICT (1975) [hereinafter cited as VALUES IN CONFLICT];
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, How SAFE IS SAFE? THE DESIGN OF POLICY ON DRUGS
AND FOOD ADDITIVES (1974) [hereinafter cited as How SAFE IS SAFE?].
1. See text accompanying notes 5-22 infra.
2. "Bias" as used in this Article refers to a partiality toward a certain outcome. It is not
intended to indicate that the partiality is necessarily malicious.
3. See text accompanying notes 37-82 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 135-78 infra.
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sideration will be given to what improvements, if any, might be made in the
present system.
II. THE DRUG TESTING PROCESS
Before new drugs5 can be marketed, they must be proven safe and
effective to the satisfaction of the FDA.6 The necessary proof includes a
three phase test7 of the drug on human beings8 and at least two well-
controlled clinical studies. 9 However, even before the research on humans
can be initiated, the sponsor of the drug must submit to the FDA a Notice of
Claimed Investigation Exemption for a New Drug (IND)10 containing infor-
mation-including results of in vitro11 and animal studies 12 on the phar-
5. Section 201(p) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1970),
defines "new drug" as:
(1) Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is not
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof ....
(2) Any drug. . . the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of
investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use under such conditions,
has become so recognized, but whichhas not, otherwise than in such investigations,
been used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions.
For a discussion of the difficulty faced in interpreting this section, see J. MASHAw & R.
MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 463-66 (1975).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970); see Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 U.S. 645, 652-
54 (1973).
7. Phase I of the human testing is directed at determining the drug's chemical effects on a
small number of healthy volunteers. Primeron New Drug Development, FDA CONSUMER 12, 12-
13 (Feb. 1974). Phase II studies involve administering the drug to a limited number of patients
who are affected with the specific disease the drug is intended to treat. During this phase, the
investigators can begin to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug while additional safety testing
on humans or animals continues. Id. 13. In Phase In, a large number of patients are treated in
order to assess the drug's safety, effectiveness and most desirable dosage. Id. 13-14. For a
detailed description of these phases, see J. GIBSON, MEDICATION, LAW AND BEHAVIOR 125-45
(1976).
8. Primer on New Drug Development, supra note 7, at 12, 13. The conditions under which
such human experimentation may occur are prescribed by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, acting pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)
(1970).
9. As used in this Article, "clinical" refers to studies on human subjects.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a)(2) (1977). Human experimentation is
necessary for several important reasons, such as that a drug may affect humans differently than
animals. See How SAFE is SAFE? 109 (remarks of Oliver H. Lowry, M.D.); id. 218 (remarks of
Samuel S. Epstein, M.D.). Other reasons for human experimentation are discussed in Preclinic-
al and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 4.
11. In vitro refers to studies performed outside of living organisms.
12. 21 C.F.R. § 321.1(a)(2) (1977). Other information submitted includes the chemical
composition of the new drug, a detailed protocol intended to be used in initial clinical studies,
the qualifications of the clinical investigators who will carry out the studies, an agreement by
the sponsor to notify FDA and all participating investigators of any adverse effects which arise
during animal or human testing, an agreement by the sponsor that it will obtain the consent of
the person on whom the drug is to be tested, and agreement to submit annual progress reports.
Primer on New Drug Development, supra note 7, at 12.
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macologic and toxic effects of the drug-from which the FDA can deter-
mine whether the drug appears to be reasonably safe and effective for human
use. 13
If human tests are permitted, 14 the sponsor may, upon completion of
the necessary tests, file a New Drug Application (NDA), seeking FDA
approval for marketing the drug. 15 The FDA then has 180 days in which to
approve or disapprove an NDA, although this review period often may be
extended.16 In evaluating an NDA, the FDA reviews the sponsor's summary
of the raw data derived from all the studies that were conducted. 17 In
addition, most FDA reviewers randomly audit certain sections of the several
hundred volumes of raw data. They find it impossible, however, to review
every page of the submitted information.' 8 If the NDA is not approved, the
FDA must give the sponsor "notice of an opportunity for a hearing. . . on
the question whether such application is approvable," 19 after which the
FDA issues a final order either approving or refusing to approve the NDA.20
Throughout this drug testing process, all human testing is commercial-
ly sponsored. Accordingly, it is essential that certain safeguards be built into
the testing system. The public must be assured that the testing of unap-
proved drugs in humans is conducted in an ethical manner. 21 Further, the
FDA must be confident that the data submitted to it by the sponsor are
complete and accurate before it determines if a drug is safe and effective for
its intended use.22
M1. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN TESTING
The testing of new drugs on human beings involves subjecting selected
13. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a)(2) (1977); Primer on New Drug Development, supra note 7, at 12.
14. The sponsor may initiate the clinical studies unless the FDA prohibits it from doing so
within 30 days of receiving the IND. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a)(2) (1977).
15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)-(d) (1970). The statute, which rejects use of uncontrolled studies,
anecdotal reports and clinical testimonials to gain new drug approval, adopted the scientific
viewpoint that in light of the unpredictable course of many diseases and the biases and
expectations of both patients and physicians, quantification of therapeutic benefit was not
possible in the absence of formal experimental controls. Weinberger v. Hyson, Westcott &
Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 617-20 (1973); Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944, 951-54 (6th Cir.
1970). See also Lasagna, The Pharmaceutical Revolution: Its Impact on Science and Society,
166 SCIENCE 1227, 1231 (1969).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1970); Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Interim Report: FDA's Review of Initial IND Submissions: A
Study of the Process for Resolving Internal Differences and an Evaluation of Scientific
Judgments (Feb. 28, 1977).
17. Review Panel on New Drug Regulations, supra note 16, at 40.
18. Id. 9, 41.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1970).
20. Id. § 355(d). Unfavorable decisions are appealable to the appropriate United States
Court of Appeals. Id. § 355(h).
21. See text accompanying notes 23-36 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 37-82 infra.
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portions of the population to a certain amount of risk for possible but
unestablished benefits to the general public.23 The risks may be minimized
and the benefits approximated by preliminary experimentation with ani-
mals, 24 by thoughtful chemical analysis and through a review of past
experience with similar drugs. 25 Nevertheless, until a drug is tested in
humans, the extent of its safety and effectiveness cannot be fully assessed. 26
Human testing involves a number of ethical considerations. Among the
most serious and widely discussed of these is the selection of subjects for
tests.2 7 Subjects should be accepted only after they have given their inform-
ed consent, indicating they are fully aware of the nature and purpose of the
tests and the possible risks involved. 28 Thus, special problems arise in
seeking the consent of persons such as prisoners, children and the mentally
retarded who have questionable ability to make such meaningful decisions.
Consideration also must be paid to safeguarding the public and test
subjects from needless exposure to risks that result from poorly designed
tests or inaccurate or biased evaluation of test data. 29 The number of test
subjects exposed to experimental drugs must be large enough to establish
significant levels of safety and efficacy, but not so large as to expose
23. How SAFE IS SAFE? 113 (statement of Oliver H. Lowry, M.D.); VALUES IN CONFLICT
153 (remarks of J. Katz, M.D.); Dyck & Richardson, The Moral Justification for Research
Using Human Subjects, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 243, 243-44 (J. Humber & R.
Almeder eds. 1976); Lasagna, supra note 15, at 1227.
24. VALUES IN CONFLICT 196 (remarks of Richard Merrill and Oliver H. Lowry, M.D.); id.
218 (remarks of Samuel S. Epstein, M.D.); New York Acad. of Medicine, Comm. on Public
Health, The Importance of Clinical Testing in Determining the Efficacy and Safety of New
Drugs, 2 J. OF NEW DRUGS 135, 138 (1962).
25. VALUES IN CONFLICT 29 (remarks of Francis D. Moore, M.D.); Trout, Problems in Drug
Research and Development, in INTERSECTIONS OF LAW AND MEDICINE 59-63 (G. Morris & M.
Norton eds. 1972).
26. B. BARBER, DRUGS AND SOCIETY 83, 84 (1967); HOW SAFE IS SAFE? 30 (remarks of W.
Clarke Wescoe, M.D.); id. 114 (remarks of Oliver H. Lowry); Dyck & Richardson, supra note
23, at 243.
27. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part I), at 350 (statement of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association); VALUES IN CONFLICT 212 (remarks of Ivan Bennett, M.D.). See
generally Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1); B. BARBER, supra note 26; VALUES IN
CONFLICT.
28. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 350-54 (statement of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association); VALUES IN CONFLICT 4, 59-60; Dyck & Richardson, supra note
23, at 251-55; Shimkin, Scientific Investigations on Man: A Medical Research Worker's View-
point, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 207, 212 (J. Humber & R. Almeder eds. 1976). The
term "informed" has been viewed as a contradiction in itself. If an experiment is being done, it
means the outcome is unknown and thus it is impossible to be informed about it. However, the
prospective subject may be informed of potential risks and educated about the results of animal
studies. See VALUES IN CONFLICT 29 (remarks of Francis D. Moore, M.D.). See generally G.
ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (1977).
29. It has been noted that the FDA's current trade secrets policy often results in unneces-
sary, and thus possibly unethical, duplicative testing. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Interim Report: An Evaluation of FDA's Trade
Secrets and Freedom of Information Policies 36, 39 (Nov. 15, 1976).
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subjects unnecessarily to an experimental drug." Additionally, tests should
be sufficiently well-designed to avoid repetition."1 Moreover, unless the
FDA is given accurate information, a drug may be marketed under inaccu-
rate claims of effectiveness or with inadequate warnings about its safe use.
This not only results in risks to those for whom the drug is prescribed, but it
also results in unnecessary exposure to test risks for the test subjects since
the results of the test in which they participated will not be reflected in
accurate labeling of the drug. 32
In light of these ethical considerations, human drug testing can be
viewed as a "public trust." 33 The concept of public trust has long been used
by the legal system to denote a special or higher standard of care on the part
of those who serve the public or who otherwise are charged with the
maintenance of public assets. 34 Under this concept, while the responsibility
30. See Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, Meeting Transcript 8 (Jan. 25, 1977) (remarks of Allen Astin, Ph.D.). Over-testing can
also pose other problems, such as creating additional suffering because of undue delay in the
introduction of an important drug. See How SAFE IS SAFE? 110 (remarks of Oliver H. Lowry,
M.D.).
31. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, supra note 30, at 8 (remarks of Allen Astin,
Ph.D.).
32. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, Part 3, at 1048 (testimony
of Charles D. May, M.D.); Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 67 (testimony of
Alexander M. Schmidt, M.D.); How SAFE IS SAFE? 120 (remarks of Peter Barton Hutt).
33. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, supra note 30, at 9 (remarks of Allen Astin,
Ph.D.).
34. For example, the framers of the Constitution were of the view that congressional office
holders were occupying an office of public trust. Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486,533 n.62
(1969); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951); Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. It has been
suggested that congressional performance should be measured by this standard. J. KIRBY,
CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST (1970). Similarly, the public trust concept has been used as a
standard of performance for nonelected office holders. To provide "for effectuation of the
important public interest in securing from public employees an accounting of their public
trust," the Supreme Court has held that public employees can be discharged for refusing to
answer incriminating questions as long as the dismissal is not the result of the employee's
assertion of fifth amendment protections. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977);
Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280,284 (1968);Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 278 (1968). The Court also has held that public employees can be required to take properly
prescribed oaths to support the Constitution "to assure those in positions of public trust [are]
willing to commit themselves to live by the constitutional process of our system." Cole v.
Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972).
The public trust concept also affects the rights of citizens when assertion of those rights
affects the public trust character of public office. Thus the Supreme Court has defended the
absolute tort immunity of prosecutors and legislators for actions within the scope of their
employment because to hold otherwise would diminish the office holder's ability to fulfill the
public trust of his office. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1976); Tenney v. Bradhove,
341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). Similarly, one of the facts that has been used to determine the
reasonableness of a government search under the fourth amendment has been the relationship
of the reason for the search to the public trust character of the officer conducting the search.
The Court in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971), in upholding the validity of home
inspection visits by welfare officials, noted that by such visits "the agency, with tax funds
[Vol. 1978:155
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for ethical drug investigation is shared by all of the participating entities ,35
the government, as the initiator of the research, would be the ultimate
trustee charged with protecting the individuals involved.3 6 To that end, the
government should consider any changes in the existing system that would
better protect the individuals involved in clinical testing. It is important to
examine the present drug testing system to determine if the public interest is
best served by industry sponsorship of drug research. In particular, it is
essential to review whether industry's desire to gain maximum profits from
drugs creates problems in either the ethical acceptability or the reliability of
the present testing system.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROFIT MOTIVE TO
RELIABLE DRUG TESTING
The hallmark of the present system of drug development is the sponsor-
ship of human drug testing by private concerns whose major motivation is
provided from federal as well as state sources, is fulfilling a public trust." Accord, Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 442 (1963) (concurring opinion, Warren, C.J.) (one aspect of
reasonableness of a wiretapping search was its purpose to prevent the corruption of "a public
servant in the performance of his public trust").
Likewise in areas other than public employment the existence of a public trust has been
used to justify special or greater duties on those who hold the trust. For example, in upholding
the fairness doctrine, an FCC rule ordering broadcasters to make time available to persons
holding viewpoints not expressed during controversial programming, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that the freedom of action of FCC license holders as protected by the first amendment
was more limited than that of newspapers because the scarcity of broadcast frequencies meant
that each license had the character of a public trust. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1969).
See also Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891,900 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
843 (1972). Cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971) (opinion of Brennan,
J.) ("In an ideal world, the responsibility of press would match the freedom and public trust
given it"). For a critique of this concept see Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment:
Observations on Forty Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 151-52
(1967).
The public trust concept also has been used .to constrain governmental actions with regard
to public water and lands. For example, governmental title to beds beneath waterways and
lakes have been considered a public trust for protection of navigation and other public func-
tions. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 321-22 (1973). Actions inconsistent with this
trust have been enjoined. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452-53 (1892)
(state could not transfer ownership of land reclaimed from Lake Michigan to a private party);
State v. Public Service Comm'r, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73 (1973) (filling a lake bed to
develop a recreation area did not violate "the obligations of the trust subject to which the state
owns the land"). For a consideration of the extent of the limitations which the public trust
concept places and should place on the management of public resources see Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471
(1970).
35. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 347 (statement of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturer's Association).
36. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, supra note 30, at 9 (remarks of Allen Astin,
Ph.D.).
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the hope of realizing a profit from the eventual sale of the drug.37 Con-
sideration must be given to how their profit motivation might affect the
objectivity and efficiency of the drug testing system.
A. The Role of the Sponsor in Drug Research.
Conventional economic thought holds that a private corporation's esti-
mate of the anticipated profit from a new product takes into account possible
social or external damage caused by the product to the extent that the
public's ill will might decrease sales38 or that its profits may be diminished
by tort actions against the company for injuries caused by the product.3 9
Decisions within the pharmaceutical industry concerning the research and
development of new drugs appear to fit this pattern. The sponsor's future
financial planning with regard to a new drug depends on an accurate
appraisal of the drug's therapeutic value,' ° including any dangers which
might lead to tort liability.41 Additionally, the anticipated cost of developing
a drug includes the expense of further testing that may be required if the
FDA finds test data to be inaccurate or inadequate.42 For these reasons, there
is a substantial corporate interest in obtaining accurate information.
Moreover, there is a strong ethically motivated desire among drug sponsors
to turn out effective products,4 3 and this is only possible when production is
preceded by thorough and valid research.
Nevertheless, because of the potential for profit from a successful drug,
it is claimed that a pharmaceutical firm's view of information about its drugs
may be colored by its natural desire to turn out commercially successful
compounds,44 and this bias may result in the firm interpreting data more
favorably than would independent observers. 45 Dr. Louis Lasagna reports
37. How SAFE IS SAFE? 174 (remarks of Phillip Handler, M.D.).
38. See Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV.
587, 592 (1969).
39. Id. 593. In addition to tort law, the pervasive development of property and contract
law, supplemented by such related legal areas as tax, patent law, copyright law, antitrust and
zoning law all affect a corporation's assessment of the risk and benefit of the proposed action.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE 25
(1969).
40. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 5), at 2325 (testimony of Leon
Goldberg, M.D.).
41. How SAFE IS SAFE? 138 (remarks of W. Clarke Wescoe, M.D.).
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970); see notes 5-20 supra and accompanying text.
43. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
44. Examination of the cyclamate literature, for example, indicates that studies sponsored
by cyclamate manufacturers generally showed that cyclamates were acceptably safe, while, in
contrast, studies sponsored by the Sugar Research Foundation tended to show that cyclamates
were harmful. How SAFE IS SAFE? 221 (remarks of Samuel S. Epstein, M.D.).
45. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, Part 4, at 1614 (profession-
al paper by Louis Lasagna, M.D.). More generally, Consumers Union reports that its tests of all
types of consumer products have demonstrated that "with the best of intentions, the manufac-
[Vol. 1978:155
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that he has observed such instances in scientific meetings, in personal
discussions and in the sometimes acrimonious exchanges which follow
evaluation of a firm's product by outside bodies such as the American
Medical Association's Council on Drugs or the Medical Letter on Drugs and
Therapeutics .46
Thus, the sponsor's motivation to obtain accurate information should
not be considered sufficient to. ensure the objectivity or reliability of test
results. In fact, as presently constituted, the relationship between the spon-
sor and its researchers may have the effect of subtly biasing the results of
studies in favor of drugs being tested, thereby undermining the accuracy of
data submitted to the FDA.
B. The Relationship Between Sponsors and Researchers.
Most pharmaceutical companies contract out their clinical research on
humans to university-affiliated hospitals.' Although some companies also
contract out their preclinical animal tests,' this research usually can be done
by private pharmaceutical firms. The contractual relationship between the
sponsor and the physician doing clinical research varies, but it usually
includes reimbursement for expenses incurred, 49 and it sometimes includes
payment for services rendered.5 0
The fact that the testing physician or clinical laboratory receives finan-
cial support from the drug's sponsor has been viewed as creating a conflict
of interest. 51 Some observers believe that a clinical researcher who is
turer of a product may be unable to take view of his own handiwork that is objective enough to
reveal the product's weaknesses." Drug Safety, 28 CONSUMER REPORTS 134 (Mar. 1963).
46. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, Part 4, at 1614-15 (profes-
sional paper by Louis Lasagna, M.D.). Dr. Lasagna further reported regarding tests he had
done of several proprietary analgesic preparations:
The reaction was extraordinarily revealing: the firms which stood to gain by the article
embraced us with warmth; the others acted as though we were lepers . . . . It is
difficult to believe that the same article could be both a "fine contribution" and an
"atrocity!" It seems more likely that one important criteria for evaluating a medical
article disregards the validity of its contents, but look to its effects on corporate
earnings.
Id.
47. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 343 ',(statement of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association); How SAFE IS SAFE? 135 (remarks of Peter Barton Hutt). The need
for outside assistance arises because the pharmaceutical firms do not have access to human
subjects on whom the drugs can be tested. B. BARBER, supra note 26, at 88.
48. Hearings on Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Labor & Public Welfare Comm., 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Part 3, at 27, 724 (1976).
49. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, Part 4, at 1601.
50. M. MIrz, BY PRESCRIrION ONLY 292 (1956). Sponsors may have to pay clinical
investigators because the job can be dull and time-consuming. Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry (Part 10), at 3986 (testimony of George Nichols, M.D.).
51. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10), at 3920 (testimony of William
Bean, M.D.); id. at 3985 (testimony of George Nichols, M.D.). See generally B. BARBER, supra
Vol. 1978:155]
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beholden to a sponsor for financial support cannot make a detached observa-
tion concerning the cause and significance of physical effects of the experi-
mental drug,5 2 and that in making subjective judgments, a researcher will be
at least unconsciously influenced by the fact that a drug company is paying
for the research and hoping for favorable results. 53
The problem of objectivity that is inherent in the relationship between
the sponsor and the investigator has been recognized for many years. In
1961, it was observed that the company's influence over researchers came
not as much from financial payment as from personal contact.
Having spent some 6 years in the business of influencing clinical
investigators, I can assure you that objectivity can be destroyed more
frequently and more effectively by the soft sell than by the bribe . . ..
A paternalistic attitude toward the detail man who is a "nice fellow"
and who requests the "study"; the positive response to the medical
director "who traveled all the way from New York" to "consult" the
"investigator"; the wish to be an "investigator" and perhaps to be
invited to give a paper at a "symposium"; the fantasy of prestige and of
the respect of the medical community; the certain knowledge that no
one ever won a Nobel Prize by publishing a negative paper about an
obscure drug; the fantasy of the "pioneer" who blazes the trail to the
discovery of a new drug-these are only a few examples of the really
potent influences which determine objectivity in drug studies.5 4
There are other ways in which the objectivity of data may be compromised.
When a sponsor is unable to obtain its first choice of an investigator, it is
possible that the clinician who finally accepts the job may do so because he
favored the drug in the first place. 55 In addition, the reliability of data from
either animal or human testing may be affected if investigators find they are
operating under rigid deadlines. If the sponsor desires to obtain results at the
earliest possible moment to recover expeditiously its investment, it may
note 26, at 88-89; M. MiNTz, supra note 50, at 292-304c.
52. How SAFE IS SAFE? 135 (remarks of Oliver H. Lowry, M.D.). Similarly, it has been
asserted that drug industry supported educational materials, while accurate, contain a "sys-
tematic bias . . . tilted in the direction of therapeutic enthusiasm." Crout, Drug Industry
Influence Poses Threat to Medical Education, 12 TRIAL 31 (1976).
53. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10), at 3921 (testimony of William
Bean, M.D.).
54. M. MINirz, supra note 50, at 302; see The Pharmaceutical Persuaders-The Industry,
The Doctor, and The Clinical Trial, LANCET, Aug. 19, 1961, at 421,421-23. The pharmaceutical
firm also can compromise less subtly the objectivity of a researcher by offering to do statistical
workups for the researcher or by offering to write his paper. Id. 422; see B. BARBER, supra note
26, at 23-24.
55. How SAFE IS SAFE? 135 (remarks of Oliver H. Lowry, M.D.); Comment, The Food and
Drug Administration: Law, Science and Politics in the Evaluation and Control of New Drug
Technology, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 858, 882-83 (1973). Contra, How SAFE IS SAFE? 135 (remarks of
W. Clarke Wescoe, M.D.).
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communicate a sense of urgency to the researcher. Such time pressures may
cause researchers to make errors in their analyses of data. 56
While acknowledging the potential for misleading results under the
present system, scientists assert that the professionalism of those involved
provides a substantial guarantee of reliability. 57 One physician described the
influence of professionalism on the drug testing process as follows:
[Tjhere are going to be some people who will be found in any communi-
ty who might bow to temptation, but. . . the vast majority of the drug
testing being done now is being done in academic centers and with high
standards regardless of who sponsors the testing. . . . Testing is being
done by people who have their academic reputations on the line, not
simply support for their future studies. The results they obtain will
eventually be published in a reputable journal-the careers of the
investigators are at stake. Thus there are check systems within the
system which will guarantee you that good testing can be done.58
Undoubtedly, professionalism is an important factor in promoting
accurate information, but recent events indicate that its effects must not be
overestimated. Caution is necessary because fraud in research exists and
apparently is rising.59 Moreover, scientists have begun to examine critically
the adverse impact that the sponsorship of research might have on the
integrity of the resulting data.60
The criminal penalties for submission of fraudulent data to the FDA61
reflect society's belief that government oversight is necessary. The FDA's
policy of checking test results submitted by sponsors similarly reflects this
concern. 62 The important questions are whether such checking is, or can be,
sufficient to verify the submitted data and whether the criminal penalties
are, or can be, sufficient incentive to sponsors to furnish reliable data. To
answer these questions, it is important to assess the extent to which prob-
lems have arisen with regard to the reliability of data.
56. New York Acad. of Medicine, supra note 24, at 143; Interagency Coordination in Drug
Research and Regulation, Part 4, at 1601.
57. How SAFE IS SAFE? 136, 200 (remarks of W. Clarke Wescoe, M.D.); cf. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEw DRUG TESTING IS NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT-
ING HUMAN TEST SUBJECTS AND THE PUBLIC 28 (1976).
58. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (PartS), at 2301-02 (testimony of Kenneth
Melmon, M.D.).
59. Rensberger, Fraud in Research is a Rising Problem in Science, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1977, at 1, cols. 1-3, at 44, cols. 3-6; Vonder Haar & Miller, Warning: Your Prescription May be
Dangerous to Health, NEW YORK, May 16, 1977, at 54; Violating Nature, TIME, Mar. 14, 1977,
at 54.
60. Horowitz, Science, Sin and Sponsorship, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1977, at 99, 101; Trippett,
Science: No Longer a Sacred Cow, TIME, Mar. 7, 1977, at 72-73.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
62. How SAFE IS SAFE? 172-74 (remarks of Phillip Handier, M.D.); see note 18 supra and
accompanying text.
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C. Misleading or Fraudulent Industry-Generated Research.
The FDA has found that several animal and clinical test results have
been fabricated or otherwise made misleading by sponsors or by toxicology
laboratories working for sponsors. 63 Recent incidents have been sufficiently
serious for FDA officials to call for a re-examination of the general reliabili-
ty of industry animal test submissions. 64
In early 1976, the FDA raised questions regarding the integrity of
animal data submitted to it by G.D. Searle Company in support of the drugs
Flagyl and Aldactone. 65 To determine the seriousness of the discrepancies in
Searle's data, the FDA formed a task force which studied the data in
question as well as data submitted in support of other Searle drug applica-
tions. On-site investigations were conducted of Searle laboratories. 66 Based
on this investigation, the FDA reported to a Senate committee that
Searle made a number of deliberate decisions which seemingly
were calculated to minimize the chances of discovering toxicity and/or
to allay FDA concern ....
In addition, Searle made other decisions which may have been
inadvertent or unintentional which produced similar results.67
On this record, the FDA. recommended to the Department of Justice that
grand jury proceedings be instituted to determine if Searle had violated the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 68
Additional investigations indicated that at least one other major phar-
maceutical manufacturer had the same sort of serious deficiencies in its
animal testing procedures, 69 that three other companies withheld adverse
animal data from the agency, 70 and that several contract animal testing
laboratories had problems similar to those at Searle." Responding to a
statement that the situation uncovered by the FDA is "serious and grave,"
the FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt replied:
I would agree with that characterization ....
63. See text accompanying notes 65-76 infra.
64. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 6-7.
65. Id. 5-6. See generally Vonder Haar & Miller, supra note 59, at 46-52.
66. Vonder Haar & Miller, supra note 59, at 57-58.
67. Hearings on Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra
note 48, at 25, 27. In addition, animal studies done by a Searle contractor, Hazelton Laborato-
ries, were also found to have serious flaws in research design and performance. Id. 27, 724.
68. Id. 724.
69. Id. 725.
70. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 43-44.
71. Hearings on Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, supra
note 48, Part 3, at 725.
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It is certainly more widespread than I would have guessed. I think
it represents an area in which we have never been active in regulating,
and now clearly we must be. 72
Similar problems were discovered in the early 1960s with respect to
clinical testing. In 1963, two clinical researchers reported that they were
approached by a pharmaceutical sponsor whose offer to finance research
was predicated upon a return promise that the test results would be favor-
able.73 In 1964, a clinical researcher pleaded nolo contendere to an indict-
ment charging that he willfully submitted fictitious reports of clinical studies
in support of five separate new drug applications. 74 Similarly, from 1963 to
1965 three pharmaceutical companies and several of their employees were
convicted of, or pleaded nolo contendere to, charges that they had fraudu-
lently withheld from the FDA information adverse to their drug applica-
tions.75 All three of the drugs that were involved, MER-29 by Richardson
Merrell, Inc., Dornwell by Wallace and Tiernan, and Flexin by McNeil
Laboratories, were approved by the FDA in ignorance of the withheld
information, and subsequently were prescribed for large numbers of pa-
tients. 76
These clinical incidents predate the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA,
which included provisions that require the registration of drug manufactur-
ers, allow for the inspection of drug plants, and impose more rigid controls
over the manufacture and approval of drugs. 7 7 Although comparable inci-
dents have not been discovered since, the FDA apparently believes that
problems still exist in the field of clinical research:
We have looked more at clinical research, and. . . have not found the
kinds of very serious errors. . . in clinical research which we found in
some of the animal toxicology research. . . . [Nevertheless] faults in
protocol design can be found in both clinical and animal research.
Inadequate training of research workers is to be found in both, and
sometimes improper data handling is to be found in both clinical re-
search and animal toxicology research. 78
The FDA believes that potentially the problems are more serious in experi-
ments involving animals than in those conducted on humans. Clinical
72. Id.
73. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation Part 3, at 1018.
74. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, Part 6, at 3197-98. See
generally M. MINrz, supra note 50, at 328-36.
75. See generally M. MINTz, supra note 50, at 17-32, 36q, 230-47; Greenberg, How Safe Are
Your Drugs, SCIENCE DIGEST, June 1975, at 54.
76. Flexin was used by 3 million people, Domwell by 160,000 and MER-29 by 418,000. M.
MiNTz, supra note 50, at 20, 27, 246.
77. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781,
76 Stat. 780. See S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962).
78. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 46-47 (testimony of Alexander M. Schmidt,
M.D.).
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research often is conducted in universities and the results may be published
in the medical literature. Animal testing is conducted by the sponsor or a
contract laboratory and is not as susceptible to peer scrutiny. 79 The FDA
also requires the submission of raw data for clinical research, but not for
animal studies.80
For both animal and clinical research, the FDA thinks that the problems
which it finds result primarily from poor and sloppy procedures, rather than
from deliberate distortions of data. 81 However, the effects of the two sources
of error are the same; both prevent the FDA from obtaining accurate
information upon which to base its decisions.8 2
V. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE RELIABILITY OF DATA
A. FDA Efforts.
Until recently, the FDA's ability to verify the animal and clinical
studies submitted to it was limited. The agency conducted no testing of its
own, 83 and it inspected only a small number of laboratories and only about
one percent of the 12,000 active clinical investigators in order to verify raw
data.84 However, the agency expects to increase significantly its surveil-
lance efforts, primarily of preclinical laboratories and clinical investigators.
After the serious discrepancies were discovered in the Searle animal data, 85
Congress authorized the FDA to hire and train 606 additional persons to be
used in research verification. 86 With these personnel, the FDA estimates that
it will be able each year to inspect half of the laboratories used in animal
testing,.half of the sponsors of clinical studies and about three percent of the
active clinical investigators.8 7
79. Id. 46.
80. Id.
81. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 12 (testimony of Alexander M. Schmidt,
M.D.).
82. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 83 (statement of Alexander M. Schmidt,
M.D.). See also Ladimer, Quackery and the Consumer-Responsibility of the Medical Profes-
sion, 18 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 436, 448 (1963).
83. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 9 (testimony of Alexander M. Schmidt,
M.D.).
84. Id. 10.
85. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
86. Letter fronfSherwin Gardner, Acting FDA Commissioner, to Jamie L. Whitten, Mem-
ber of the House of Representatives (Jan. 3, 1977) (Food and Drug Administration 1977 Budget
Amendment).
87. During 1977, the FDA was to inspect at least 80 of the 550 laboratories that conduct
animal testing, 85 of the research sponsors and 165 of the 12,000 clinical investigators. State-
ment by Sherwin Gardner, Acting FDA Commissioner, Subcomm. on Health and Scientific
Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources and Subcomm. on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 10, 1977, at 7, 11.
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To facilitate these inspections, the FDA is considering imposing uni-
form standards for research procedures. For example, in the area of animal
studies, it has proposed regulations delineating Good Laboratory Practice
for Nonclinical Laboratory Studies. 8 The proposed regulations, which are
analogous to the agency's good manufacturing practice regulations, 89 set
standards for several aspects of animal testing: animal husbandry practices,
training of personnel, recording and handling data, administration of the test
chemical, recordkeeping, and the reporting of results to management. 90 In
addition, the proposed regulations require testing laboratories to establish
quality control units. Such units would be responsible for assuring that
specific written procedures and protocols are developed for each animal
study, for monitoring the studies to assure compliance with those procedures
and protocols, and for certifying to management that the study was conduct-
ed in accordance with FDA regulations. 91
The FDA's newly expanded inspection staff would also conduct in-
spections of animal laboratories in order to determine whether they are
complying with the proposed animal testing regulations. 92 These inspections
would be similar to those of drug manufacturing facilities, which assess
whether the facilities are in compliance with the FDA's manufacturing
practice regulations. 93 Since the manufacturing inspections have improved
the quality of the drug manufacturing process, the FDA believes this
program would likewise improve the quality of the animal research. 94
These proposals have several advantages. The guidelines would help
eliminate inefficiency by the sponsor and thus minimize the possibility that
test subjects would be exposed unnecessarily to an unapproved drug. The
standards also would provide the FDA with a basis for determining whether
the research was conducted in a procedurally sound manner, and they would
help to prevent the "sloppy science" of which the FDA currently com-
plains. 95 Further, assuring procedural regularity to some extent would help
prevent deliberate distortions of data, since methodological errors that are
discovered may serve as a clue to the FDA to search for more serious
problems.
While the FDA's verification program promises to increase sponsors'
incentive to submit accurate data to the agency, one problem in data
reliability nonetheless may remain. The possibility would still exist that data
88. 41 Fed. Reg. 51206 (1976).
89. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 98.
90. Id. 99.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. 100.
94. Id.
95. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
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submitted to the FDA could be unintentionally and subtly biased. Whether
FDA reviewers are capable of detecting subtle biases in the data they review
appears to be an open question. One FDA official, Dr. Frances 0. Kelsey,
believes that subtle shadings in reporting and evaluating data are beyond the
agency's ability to detect. 96 Recently, however, the Commissioner of the
FDA has voiced the belief that FDA reviewers are "fully able to detect
inaccurate or self-serving analyses or conclusions." 97 Despite this debate
and whatever the absolute capabilities of FDA reviewers, it seems clear that
the sheer volume of the workload of FDA investigators may tax their ability
to detect errors introduced by bias.
98
B. Further Modifications in the Present Systems Designed to Improve the
Accuracy of Experimental Data.
1. Clinical Research Standards. It has been suggested that the only
means of policing bias in research is to insist on strict adherence to properly
designed research standards:
[A]n approach to the problem of lack of objectivity in drug studies
through the prohibition of one or more of the thousands of incentives to
bias is naive and misdirected. . . .Our attention should center on the
signs of objectivity in drug studies. . . .Objectivity and/or its absence
are inherent in the design of the study, the manner of its execution and
the validity of the conclusions drawn from it . . . .The objective
examination of an adequately detailed report of a study in the light of
well-established and accepted standards of scientific methodology
forms the best instrument for evaluating objectivity."
Under the present system of clinical testing, the pharmaceutical firm
and the clinical investigator conducting the research design the protocols for
each of the clinical studies. 100 For several years, the FDA has been in the
process of developing a series of guidelines that are to be given to sponsors
to delineate, for different classes of drugs, what the agency considers to be
the important considerations in clinical studies. 10 1 The FDA does not con-
sider these guidelines to be formal protocols that must be rigidly followed,
but it expects that adherence to the guidelines will enable researchers to
avoid wasteful, poorly designed, unacceptable testing.' °2
96. Comment, supra note 55, at 881.
97. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 9.
98. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
99. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 5), at 2290 (letter from A. Dale
Console, M.D., to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey).
100. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, NEW DRUGS PENDING
LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No. 13, 94TH CONG. 37 (1976).
101. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Interim Report: Preclinical and Clinical Guidelines at the Bureau of Drugs of the Food and Drug
Administration (Feb. 28, 1977).
102. Id.
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In addition to these voluntary guidelines, greater supervision by the
FDA over clinical studies has been proposed as a means for uniformly
improving the quality of data. One means of increasing the agency's super-
visory role would be to institute meetings with the sponsor at critical times
during the investigational process. 103 There also have been suggestions that
the FDA be given greater authority in this area. The agency could, for
example, be given additional authority to approve individual protocols
before clinical studies are initiated 0 4 and to approve sequentially each step
of the investigational process before the next step could be commenced.10 5
These proposals should help improve the overall quality of clinical
data106 because to the extent that they would standardize research practices,
or at least identify the practices used for a particular experiment, the FDA
could more easily monitor the proper implementation of a study. I°7 How-
ever, there are important disadvantages that may offset these advantages.
Standardizing research may discourage innovation and thereby decrease the
availability of new drugs. 108 Additionally, the proposals may slow the drug
development process, which of course, would have the same effect. 109 The
latter consequence has been stressed by industry research scientists:
[W]e believe it would take substantially longer for important new drugs
to be made broadly available for the treatment of diseases, if the
research and development process in this country has to suffer yet
another quantum increase in the level of formalized regulatory involve-
ment during the exquisitely sensitive eafly stages of discovery and
clinical validation. Furthermore, although we strongly endorse the
value of consulting FDA on program plans . . . we view with great
concern the present proposal to make this a highly structured proce-
dure, culminating in formal approval by the agency.11
The establishment and monitoring of standards for animal and clinical
studies appears to be a useful first step in improving the quality of data that
are submitted to the FDA. But it is important that such guidelines not be so
rigid as to create either a research atmosphere that discourages the devel-
opment of new drugs or to foster further delays in the process for drug
approval.
2. Changes in Enforcement Policies. Increasing the FDA's en-
forcement efforts is another way to improve the reliability of information
103. It has been recommended that conferences between the FDA and the sponsor be
optional at the end of the first phase of clinical studies and be mandatory prior to initiation of
large scale clinical trials. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, supra note 16, at 4.
104. See S. 2697, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404(d)(2) (1975).
105. Id. § 404(b)(2).
106. See notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 88-94 supra and accompanying text.
108. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, supra note 101, at 44.
109. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTFIUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 100, at 42.
110. Id.
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submitted to the agency. Under the FDCA if the agency receives inaccurate
or misleading data, it may use any of the following sanctions: an informa-
tion letter advising a firm or person of violations of law and regulations;"' 1 a
regulatory letter which cites specific violations, sets a deadline for a re-
sponse regarding corrective actions and advises that administrative or legal
action will be taken if corrective action is not undertaken; 12 disqualification of
clinical investigators from eligibility to receive investigational new drugs if
they repeatedly or deliberately violate the FDCA or its regulations;1
3
termination of a sponsor's IND; 4 disapproval of an NDA;n 5 or withdrawal
of a marketed drug. 116 The following legal actions can be initiated through
the Department of Justice: prosecuting an individual for use of the mails to
submit fraudulent data to the government; 117 enjoining individuals or firms
from violation of the FDCA or regulations; 118 seizing any drug which is
adulterated or misbranded when introduced into, or while it is in, interstate
commerce. 1
19
A 1976 Government Accounting Office (GAO) investigation reported
that, according to the FDA, "in most cases, clinical investigators inspected
were not fully complying with federal law or agency regulations and that
pharmaceutical sponsors were not adequately monitoring their clinical in-
vestigators."' 20 Nevertheless, the GAO found that the FDA made only
"limited use" of its potential enforcement actions. 121 The GAO noted that,
since 1962, the FDA has recommended that the Department of Justice
initiate only two prosecutions for fraud, that it had disqualified only twenty
clinical investigators and that the FDA's Bureau of Drugs had never issued a
regulatory letter concerning noncompliance with testing regulations. 122
However, the FDA has sent information letters to those found not in
compliance after an FDA investigation. 1 3
111. FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEw DRUG TESTING 21.
112. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 369.
113. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(c)(1)-(2) (1977).
114. Id. § 312.1(d).
115. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 314.111 (1977).
116. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (Supp. V 1975); 21 C.F.R. § 314.115 (1977).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
118. Id. § 332(a).
119. 21 U.S.C.A. § 334 (West Supp. 1977). See generally CIBA Corp. v. Weinberger, 412
U.S. 640, 644 (1973).
120. FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEW DRUG TESTNG 11; Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2),
at 365. The GAO indicated that 1972 survey by the FDA revealed that seventy-four percent of
the investigators sampled failed to comply with one or more requirements of the law and
regulations. Id.
121. FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEW DRUG TESTING 11. The GAO notes that the FDA does
not disagree with the findings but does dispute some of the recommendations. Id. 27. See also
Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 360-77.
122. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 369.
123. FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEW DRUG TESTING 21-22.
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The GAO conclusion that the FDA has been lax in its enforcement
efforts may be somewhat overstated because many of the violations un-
covered may not have been serious enough to warrant FDA action.
Nevertheless, as the GAO indicates, lesser administrative sanctions were
available to the agency for the more minor infractions. Moreover, additional
evidence tends to corroborate the GAO's belief that the FDA has not been an
efficient enforcer of its rules. On several occasions between 1971 and 1974,
the FDA failed to deal in a timely fashion with enforcement recommenda-
tions, apparently losing them somewhere in its bureaucracy.1 24 For exam-
ple, in April 1970, the FDA discovered that a nine-month period had
elapsed between the discovery of unacceptable adverse effects in animals by
Lederle Laboratory employees and the reporting of these results to the FDA.
After conducting three inspections of Lederle in 1971, an FDA inspection
team recommended that the company not be prosecuted because it had found
Lederle management had promptly informed the FDA of the test results
upon learning of them from employees who had been tardy in their report-
ing. The FDA concluded that the failure of Lederle employees to inform
management was a "question of scientific judgment." 125 The inspection
team recommended to the Director of Bureau of Drugs of the FDA that a
letter of warning be sent to Lederle recommending management changes to
prevent further delays in providing information of this sort to the FDA. Four
years later, the FDA discovered that the memorandum containing this
recommendation had never reached the Bureau Director's office. 126 A simi-
lar experience occurred with the drug Slow-K. In that case, a recom-
mendation that criminal action be considered against Ciba-Geigy for with-
holding information was not acted upon between 1972 and 1974 because of
a bureaucratic misunderstanding as to who would refer the case to the
Department of Justice. 127
Based on his observations of the FDA compliance efforts, a GAO
official concluded that, because of lax enforcement, clinical researchers
could feel unconstrained by FDA regulations concerning the quality of their
research.128 Thus, the adoption of an active and aggressive enforcement
posture on the part of the agency clearly would improve the FDA's efforts to
improve the reliability of data.
The FDA, however, disagrees. Commenting upon the GAO recom-
mendations, it observed:
124. See Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 133-40.
125. Id. 138.
126. Id. 139.
127. Id. 134-35.
128. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 347-48.
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GAO assumes an adversarial relationship between FDA and the re-
search community. The goals of science and medicine and of FDA
regulation are the same: ethical research, scientifically valid and useful
research, research protecting and benefiting both the subjects and
patients generally. Achieving these objectives requires both clear expo-
sition of FDA policies to encourage understanding and compliance and
judicious application of sanctions in those situations where clearly
improper behavior is found. For the FDA to approach researchers as
though their only incentive to comply is threat of FDA action, how-
ever, demeans the ethical and professional standards of these persons
and is unjustified by the evidence. Moreover, a hostile FDA might
produce a reluctance to cooperate with the Agency, or worse, a disin-
centive for research itself. 29
The FDA is charged with the responsibility to enforce compliance with
the FDCA and the regulations it promulgates. At times, that responsibility
will require the agency to assume an adversarial posture with respect to drug
producers. The issue is not whether the FDA should be adversarial, but how
to balance its compliance and educational efforts. In light of the GAO study
and other examples cited above, it appears that the FDA's efforts have
insufficiently stressed its enforcement role.
Yet, even if the FDA did increase its enforcement efforts, the enor-
mous number of experiments being conducted and the relatively small size
of the FDA enforcement staff might still make detection of violations
difficult. The Department of the Interior solved a similar problem with
respect to coal mine inspections by singling out those coal mines whose
safety performance records were the worst and concentrating its enforce-
ment efforts on them. 130 Senator Richard Schweiker has proposed that the
FDA implement a similar plan:
We can come up with similar proposals that in spot checking the
pharmaceutical companies . . . we begin to establish some kind of
scientific reliability factor. When a company falls into a questionable
status . . . we escalate the procedures and the inspections on all the
products.' 3'
Senator Gaylord Nelson has suggested the cost of the additional monitoring
might be assessed to the drug firm.132
A formal system of selective review would be the best use of the FDA's
limited enforcement resources. In addition, such a system would reward
129. FEDERAL CONTROL OF NEw DRUG TESTING 28.
130. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 1), at 69.
131. Id.
132. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 159. The FDA has stated that it already
informally distinguishes between companies it perceives are doing a good job and those that are
not, because medical officers more meticulously check the data from suspect companies.
Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part I), at 70.
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companies that meet FDA standards. Companies will know that compliance
will free them from time-consuming inspections 133 and that competitors will
not gain an advantage over them by engaging in improper conduct. If such a
system is combined with the FDA's present plans to check data randomly, 134
this proposal would seem to be useful to the agency.
C. Alternatives to the Present System Designed to Improve the Accuracy
of Experimental Data.
While the preceding proposals could be implemented without con-
siderable change in the present system of drug testing, consideration also
has been given to proposals that would dramatically alter that system. These
proposals include establishing a third-party testing apparatus to either verify
industry test results or to replace industry testing altogether.
1. Limited Third-Party Testing. Although strengthening the pre-
sent FDA oversight of drug testing might improve both the incentive to
submit accurate information to the FDA and the agency's ability to check
the accuracy of the information submitted, the FDA would still lack means
to verify whether the same test results could be arrived at independently.
Recently, the FDA decided that an objective, competent third-party was
needed to verify certain aspects of animal test data submitted by the G.D.
Searle Company in support of Aspartame, an artificial sweetener. 135 The
FDA informed Searle that certain of the Aspartame studies had to be verified
utilizing a review mechanism which operated independently of, but was
funded by, Searle or other private sources. 136 The FDA required that the
authentication review be a matter of public record because the ultimate
conclusion with regard to Aspartame would be sharply scrutinized and
therefore had to be "the product of sound, open, and thus credible proce-
dure. ' 137
If the procedure followed with regard to Aspartame were formalized
and continued, the FDA could seek independent testing of animal data
submitted to it whenever such data were conflicting or insufficient, a role
which has been urged for the agency. 138 Since the FDA would have access
133. Id. 69.
134. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
135. Statement by Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner, FDA, Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, at Appendix G, 3 (Jan. 13, 1977). A current legislative proposal
would explicitly authorize limited third-party testing for the FDA. H.R. 11617, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 476 (1976). The purpose of the legislation is to allow health officials to study the relative
efficacy of drugs that are used to treat the same disease. However, it is possible to interpret the
proposal as also authorizing testing for purposes of verification.
136. Statement by Sherwin Gardner, supra note 135.
137. Id. at Appendix G, 4.
138. H. DOWLINo, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION AND USE OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 250-51 (1970); Dowling, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Doctor, 264
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to independent test results from persons with no ties to the sponsor, there
would be added incentive for sponsors both to avoid deliberate distortions of
data and to try to minimize any distortions arising from possible bias. If the
expense of such testing were assessed to the company, as was done with
Aspartame, there would be a minimal federal expenditure involved.
The FDA could in addition, or alternatively, use a third-party testing
mechanism to spot check the results of animal experimentation by recon-
ducting a sample of studies. 139 Such spot checking would be an incentive for
sponsors to obtain accurate results, since there would be a greater probabili-
ty that inaccurate data would be discovered.
However, there are problems with the spot checking approach. Given
the large number of animal experiments that are conducted at any one time,
an elaborate system of spot checking would be required to discover a
significant amount of inaccuracies. In addition, while the FDA has charged
a sponsor for the expense of additional independent testing in an instance
where the sponsor may have submitted inaccurate data, 140 it is questionable
whether it would be proper to assess sponsors the cost of random checking
where they have not produced inaccurate data in the past.
Despite these disadvantages, spot checking of animal studies may be
useful. The program could be fairly small, operated at a reasonable cost to
the government or industry, and because sponsors would not know be-
forehand if their tests would be checked, it could still have the effect of
creating an incentive to conduct accurate tests. 141 Moreover, since there
would be no indication that the data under examination were faulty, the
validation tests could be conducted while studies of the drug continued. The
program therefore would not slow the drug development process.
Use of limited third-party testing for clinical studies presents more
difficult problems. Most importantly, there is a serious ethical problem in
having research subjects volunteer to undergo risks to obtain data that the
FDA may already have in accurate form. The social benefit that normally
justifies human testing is not as compelling in such an instance. In addition,
if third-party testing were used to verify clinical data, the difficulty would
arise of obtaining test subjects in a second test who have virtually the same
N.E. J. MEDICINE 75, 77 (1961). Although it has been proposed that the FDA undertake the
testing, such involvement seems improper for the agency since it is to judge the results of the
research. See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation, Part 4, at 1620 (letter
from Heber W. Youngken, Jr., M.D., to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (Oct. 23, 1963)).
139. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, supra note 30, at 14 (remarks of David Rail,
M.D., Ph.D.).
140. See notes 135-37 supra and accompanying text.
141. The size of the program should correspond to the likelihood of a sponsor submitting
misleading or inaccurate data. Anything but a token spot checking effort should have the
desired effect on sponsors, especially if it is combined with an aggressive enforcement pro-
gram. See notes 111-19 supra and accompanying text.
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characteristics as subjects in the original test. 142 Humans also bring an
element of subjectivity to tests which animals do not; some people might not
report adverse reactions that others would. Finally, because clinical research
involves a large number of persons and extends over a long period of
time,143 the verification procedure would be slow and expensive.
2. Complete Third-Party Testing. An independent third-party test-
ing system for drugs is envisioned in legislation introduced by Senator
Gaylord Nelson."44 Under this proposal, the responsibility for clinical test-
ing would be shifted from the sponsor to the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW).145 The government would either test the drugs itself or
it would arrange for the tests to be conducted by independent contractors. 146
Because these two systems have different advantages and disadvantages,
they will be analyzed separately.
(a) Government testing. The principal advantage of government
testing of new drugs is the elimination of the adverse consequences that
result from the profit motivation that is connected with private testing. It is
thought that government researchers would be less biased towards results
favorable to the sponsor and the potential for deliberate distortion thereby
would be decreased. 147 In addition, proponents of this system claim that
because there is less likelihood of bias, many of the current complicated
regulations which are intended to protect the public would be simplified. 
148
For that reason and because of the centralization of testing in the govern-
ment, it is believed the drug testing system "could be speeded up immeasur-
ably.' 1 49 Finally, it has been claimed that government testing would be less
expensive because it would be better organized than the present system,
where research is done in "a rather haphazard fashion with small funding
[and] many, many investigators of questionable quality." 150
Whether the cost and efficiency advantages of a government testing
system in fact would be realized depends on the scientific and organizational
ability of the agency made responsible for the testing. Because that agency
142. Animals used in experiments have been raised in sterile laboratory environments.
Humans who are test subjects often bring a variety of characteristics to the testing situation that
may influence the effect that the drug has on them.
143. See notes 5-22 supra and accompanying text.
144. S. 1321, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 513 (1975).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10), at 3985 (testimony of George
Nichols, Jr., M.D.).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 7), at 2770 (testimony of William
O'Brien, M.D.).
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would be a government bureaucracy, some scientists doubt that research
would be improved. 151 In particular, critics point out that industry presently
is a more efficient researcher than either the government or universities, 152
presumably because it has a profit incentive to be so. The FDA believes that
the work done by government testers may be no more accurate than that
done by industry-a fact it believes is supported by its testing of Red Dye
No. 2, a food additive, where the FDA committed serious errors in its
animal studies. 153 In addition, there is some evidence that test subjects
would not be any safer in government tests than they are in those sponsored
by industry.' 54
Other disadvantages of government testing have been identified. The
FDA, for example, believes that the government, as the only drug tester,
would inevitably come to set research priorities, and since any monopoly,
public or private, stagnates, it would be detrimentally determining the
directions of drug innovation. 155 The FDA also believes that if HEW were to
conduct research on new drugs, it would be unable to judge impartially their
safety and effectiveness during the approval process. 156 Finally, several
important questions related to government testing have not yet been re-
solved, such as the effect of government third-party testing on the research
incentives of the pharmaceutical companies, 157 and its effect on and the
present shortage of qualified clinical researchers.1 58
Based on their perception of the disadvantages of government testing,
the FDA and others believe it is too early to adopt such a proposal. 15 9
Nevertheless, they have asserted that government testing should be con-
sidered a last resort after the other, less drastic proposals have been tried.160
Such a change is thought to be especially untimely because the FDA has just
initiated efforts to guarantee more accurate data.' 61
151. Cf. New York Acad. of Medicine, supra note 24.
152. Cf. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 5). at 2301 (testimony of Ken-
neth Melmon, M.D.).
153. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 103-04.
154. See, e.g., Trippett, supra note 60, at 72-73.
155. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 2), at 103; accord,
Dowling, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Doctor, supra note 138, at 75.
156. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 5), at 2163 (testimony of HEW
Assistant Secretary for Health, Charles Edwards, M.D.).
157. See Comment, supra note 55, at 888.
158. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 5), at 2163 (testimony of HEW
Assistant Secretary for Health, Charles Edwards, M.D.).
159. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 160 (testimony of Alexander M. Schmidt,
M.D.); Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Part 5), at 2301-02 (testimony of Kenneth
Melmon, M.D.).
160. See, e.g., Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 160 (testimony of Alexander M.
Schmidt, M.D.).
161. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Iidustry (Part 5), at 2163 (testimony of HEW
[Vol. 1978:155
NEW DRUG RESEARCH
In response to these assertions by the FDA, Senator Nelson has noted
that although the FDA has been complaining about inaccurate and mislead-
ing data since 1966, its efforts have not yet produced desired im-
provements. 162 Consequently, he believes that there is a substantial likeli-
hood that in the future the FDA will indicate that it has found dishonest data
while again urging that it be given more time to perfect the system.
163
(b) Independent contracting. Under a system of independent
contracting, the government would be responsible for hiring and paying
independent researchers. 164 The information produced would be given to
both the pharmaceutical sponsor and the FDA for analysis. 165 The cost of
research could be assessed to the sponsor. 166 As with government testing,
the principle advantage of such independent contracting is that the research-
er would be less biased towards results favorable to the sponsor and less
likely to withhold information about problems with the drug's safety and
efficacy. 167
Changing only the payment mechanism, however, may not accomplish
this result. Part of the possible bias in the existing system arises simply from
the contacts between the researcher and the sponsor. 168 To eliminate this
potential source of influence, the investigators would have to be isolated
from the sponsor for the duration of the research. 16 9
Proponents of independent contracting assert that its feasibility has
already been established. It has been noted that certain sections of the
National Institutes of Health already perform the functions which the
contracting agency would undertake. 170 The current practice of awarding
Assistant Secretary for Health, Charles Edwards, M.D.); id. 2325 (testimony of Leon Gold-
berg, M.D.).
162. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 157.
163. Id.
164. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10), at 3920 (testimony of William
Bean, M.D.); Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part ;9, at 2768 (testimony of
Kenneth Melmon, M.D.); How SAFE IS SAFE? 223-24.
165. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 7), at 2777 (statement of Donald
Mainland, M.D.).
166. See S. 1321, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 513 (1975); Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry (Part 10), at 3920 (testimony of William Bean, M.D.).
167. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10), at 3920.
168. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
169. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 7), at 2777 (statement of Donald
Mainland, M.D.).
One scientist has suggested that the mere separation of the payment and the researcher
would be a significant improvement without regard to whether the industry could or could not
contact the investigator. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10), at 3986 (tes-
timony of George Nichols, M.D.).
170. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 7), at 2768 (statement of Donald
Mainland, M.D.). There are also other examples of successful independent evaluation of new
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bids competitively on the basis of the quality of protocols, technical compe-
tence and economic efficiency could be continued.' 71 The progress of the
testing could be monitored by periodic project site visits, as is routinely
done with federal contracts.172
In addition, there is some indication that a rule restricting access of the
sponsor to the researcher is feasible. The Cooperating Clinics Committee of
the American Arthritis Association conducts independent clinical trials of
drugs under the condition that, after the manufacturer has supplied the drug,
its agents can have no further contact with the investigators until after
completion of the trials. 173 Any necessary communication is made through a
coordinator's office. 174
Supporters of this proposal have asserted that it has other advantages
over a government testing system. The contracting agency could utilize
leading medical experts both to choose the researchers and laboratories
which would be involved in the testing and to do the actual testing. 175 The
proposal's supporters do not believe that the government could attract
researchers with the same quality of expertise to work full time for the
government in testing new drugs. 176
While complete government testing or contracting may be feasible for
clinical testing, it apparently would not work as well for animal testing.
Animal research is closely related to drug innovation. Through animal
testing, the sponsor can determine the potential therapeutic properties of
compounds under consideration. 177 Removal of even some animal tests from
sponsors could undermine the basic process of drug development. More-
over, the FDA believes that contracting may be difficult because most of the
country's expertise in toxicology is located within the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Consequently, there are an insufficient number of independent animal
testing laboratories to undertake the necessary research. 178
drugs. Id. (statement of Donald Mainland, M.D., English Medical Research Council); Competi-
tive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 10), at 3920 (testimony of William Bean, M.D.,
National Vitamin Foundation and the Nutrition Foundation). The model of government bro-
kering of research also was used successfully with the Corporation to Control Telstar. CoNsum-
ERS REPORTS, Mar. 1963, at 136, reprinted in Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and
Regulation, Part 3, at 1052.
171. How SAFE IS SAFE? 223.
172. Id.
173. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry (Part 7), at 2777 (statement of Donald
Mainland, M.D.).
174. Id.
175. Id. 2768 (testimony of George Nichols, M.D.).
176. Id.
177. Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, supra note 16, at 18.
178. Preclinical and Clinical Testing (Part 2), at 104. It appears likely that if the government
were to adopt a program of independent contracting for animal testing, the supply of indepen-
dent toxicology laboratories eventually would increase to meet the demand.
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Despite the fact that government contracting of drug research may
appear to be a less drastic change in drug testing than direct government
testing, it still would involve a considerable alteration of the present drug
development process. Problems of coordination among the contractor, the
FDA, and the sponsor must be worked out. In addition, the process would
have to be arranged so that the contracting out of research does not unneces-
sarily prolong the drug development process.
It is difficult to anticipate all of the possible complications which might
arise if the government does assume responsibility for contracting out
research on new drugs. Thus, before any final decision is made to adopt this
approach, it would seem wise to implement a pilot program that involves
government testing of a limited number of drugs.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Under the present drug testing system, there are few mechanisms to
ensure that the FDA receives reliable data in its consideration of the safety
and effectiveness of a new drug. Without accurate data, the agency may lack
an adequate basis upon which to evaluate the risks and benefits associated
with a drug's use. Serious questions can also be raised about the morality of
human testing when data from such testing are not accurately presented to
the FDA.
Despite the sponsor's financial interest in deriving precise information
from clinical tests and the professionalism of researchers involved in testing,
the possibility remains that data submitted to the agency will be at least
unconsciously biased and, at worse, fraudulent. Likewise, criminal penal-
ties for submission of fraudulent information and the FDA's monitoring of
laboratory practices provide incentive for the submission of accurate infor-
mation. However, these factors have not always prevented submission of
fraudulent data and they are not useful mechanisms for deterring subtle bias
in data analysis. Accordingly, five further steps should be taken to minimize
problems of inaccurate and misleading test information.
First, the FDA already has proposed regulations concerning Good
Laboratory Practice for Nonclinical Laboratories. The agency hopes to
inspect each nonclinical laboratory every two years to determine if the
laboratories are in compliance with the regulations. In addition to this
inspection program, the FDA should use its authority for limited third-party
testing to verify animal test information submitted to it. If such authority is
limited to spot checks where sponsors have submitted misleading or inaccu-
rate information in the past, limited third-party testing should serve as an
additional incentive for the submission of reliable information. Spot check-
ing would not slow the development process since it could be conducted
simultaneously with the ongoing testing.
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This form of limited third-party testing is thought to be preferable to
complete third-party testing for animal experimentation. While completely
removing animal testing from sponsors to an independent third party is a
more direct method by which to eliminate some of the possibility of bias or
distortion, it may also create a research disincentive since the animal testing
process is closely tied to sponsor innovation. Moreover, complete third-
party testing could not be implemented as rapidly as the partial testing
approach because presently animal testing expertise independent of the
pharmaceutical industry is limited.
A second step would be for the FDA to finalize its guidelines for
clinical research to ensure that sponsors are fully aware of the agency's
requirements for such research. The inaccuracy and sloppiness of industry-
generated data apparently results in part from lack of guidance from the
FDA regarding the research requirements. Thus such guidelines could
reduce inefficiency in the testing process, thereby minimizing the possibility
that test subjects would be exposed to risks unnecessarily. Clinical
guidelines also would provide the FDA with a further basis for evaluating
the industry submissions of information.
In addition, if, in conjunction with the release of guidelines, the FDA
were to increase its supervisory role during the clinical investigational
period for new drugs, the quality of data submitted as a result of clinical
studies would be enhanced. For example, the FDA might institute confer-
ences with the sponsor at critical times during the drug development proc-
ess, such as prior to initiation of large-scale clinical trials.
As a fourth innovation, the FDA should utilize its present authority to
impose administrative sanctions against anyone found to have submitted
inaccurate or misleading material information or, where appropriate, recom-
mend criminal prosecutions. The FDA has assigned too low a priority to
enforcement of the provisions of the FDCA and those of its regulations that
are intended to ensure the accuracy of data. Although the FDA must take
care to avoid a relationship with the industry that is so adversarial as to be
counter-productive, its behavior must also convince researchers and drug
sponsors that sanctions will be imposed on those who submit inaccurate or
misleading information.
Finally, a pilot program should be implemented whereby HEW would
contract with independent parties for the clinical testing of a class of drugs
which the FDA would choose based on its assessment of which class of
drugs could benefit most from the program. Additional assurance of the
accuracy of clinical research could be best implemented through such a
program of government contracting. The other possible alternatives appear
to be less advantageous than the contracting approach. Limited third-party
testing to verify existing clinical research information would pose ethical
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problems and would be difficult, costly and time-consuming. Complete
testing by the government would necessitate a sizable government bureau-
cracy which might not be as efficient or innovative as the private sector. By
comparison, government contracting would be a lesser regulatory intrusion.
But since it would be a substantial change from the present system, it is
difficult to foresee all of the possible complications which might arise if
government contracting is adopted. For that reason, a pilot program would
be a reasonable method to approach the implementation of this proposal.
